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Abstract
Primary user emulation (PUE) attacks on cognitive radio networks pose a serious threat to the deployment of this
technique. Previous approaches usually depend on individual or combined received signal strength (RSS) measurements
to detect emulators. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism based on physical layer network coding to detect the
emulators. When two signal sequences interfere at the receiver, the starting point of collision is determined by the
distances among the receiver and the senders. Using the signal interference results at multiple receivers and the positions
of reference senders, we can determine the position of the ‘claimed’ primary user. We can then compare this localization
result with the known position of the primary user to detect the PUE attack. We design a PUE detection mechanism for
wireless networks with trustworthy reference senders. We analyze the overhead of the proposed approach and study its
detection accuracy through simulation.
c© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Z. Khan and N. Javaid.
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1. Introduction
The dynamic spectrum access technique allows wireless nodes to use spectrum sensing to identify the
‘white spaces’ in licensed spectrum. The cognitive radios will then opportunistically utilize these white
spaces. To avoid any interference with the primary users, a secondary user must leave the occupied channels
if it detects a primary user. Therefore, one of the major technical challenges in spectrum sensing is the
problem of precisely identifying the signals of the real primary users. The malicious secondary users can
mimic the spectral characteristics of primary users to gain priority access to the wireless channels, which is
called “primary user emulation” (PUE) attacks.
Existing approaches to detecting the PUE attacks can be divided into two groups: communication ori-
ented and localization oriented. In the ﬁrst group, the secondary nodes use the spectrum sensing techniques
to match the characteristics of the radio signals to those of the primary user. The detection mechanisms
include ﬁlter and cyclostationary feature detection [1], spectrum decision and channel parameters [2], and
shadow senders [3]. In the second group, the researchers use the received signals to estimate the position
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of the sender. They have designed diﬀerent methods to model the communication channels and improve
the signal measurement accuracy [4]. Outliers in localization procedures are ﬁltered out to improve the
detection accuracy of PUE attacks [5].
In this paper, we propose a PUE attack detection mechanism based on the physical layer network coding
(PNC) technique. PNC uses the additive nature of the electromagnetic waves to serve as the coding proce-
dure. In our approach, we estimate the position of a wireless node by letting its radio signals interfere with a
reference sender. These interfered sequences will be captured by multiple secondary users. Combining the
starting points of signal interference results with their positions, the secondary users will determine a group
of hyperbolas on which the wireless sender resides. Then they will compare the intersection point of these
hyperbolas with the known position of the primary user to detect the PUE attack.
To turn the approach into a practical solution, research challenges from multiple aspects must be care-
fully addressed. From the network point of view, we need to verify the authenticity of the received signals
and accurately locate the position of the sender. From the security point of view, we need to design mecha-
nisms to identify the false claims of positions and signal interference results provided by malicious nodes.
Our investigation has the following contributions: (1) The research will demonstrate that in addition to
improving the bandwidth usage eﬃciency in wireless networks, physical layer network coding can also be
used to detect malicious attacks. (2) The proposed PUE attack detection mechanism does not require the
deployment of any special hardware. The assumed trustworthy reference senders already exist in the IEEE
standards such as 802.22 and 802.16h. (3) The overhead and detection accuracy of the approach are studied
through both theoretical analysis and simulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic idea of using
PNC for localization. In Section 3, we present the details of the proposed approach. The overhead and
detection accuracy of the approach are studied in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Localization through Physical Layer Network Coding
2.1. System Assumptions
We assume that the primary user (e.g. a TV station) is located at a ﬁxed position and both the secondary
users and the attackers know its position. Since FCC requires all TV towers or radio stations to enforce
strict physical security, we assume that the secondary users or the attackers cannot be physically close to the
primary user. We assume that all secondary users are equipped with GPS and a secure, lightweight pseudo
random bit generator (PRBG) [6]. The authenticity and integrity of the packets are protected by the Message
Authentication Code (MAC). The details of packet authentication will be discussed in Section 3.
We assume that the attackers also have the GPS device and the PRBG. An attacker can mimic a primary
user’s radio signals. Multiple attackers can collaborate to conduct a PUE attack. However, the attackers do
not have the computation power to compromise the encryption keys or reverse a secure hash function.
2.2. Use PNC to Achieve Localization
Figure 1 illustrates the basic idea of physical layer network coding. In the topology, A and C depend on
B to forward the frames between them. In the PNC approach, A and C will send out their packets and B
will receive the interference results of the two frames. It will rebroadcast the received signals to both A and
C so that they can leverage their knowledge about f rame1 and f rame2 respectively to separate the signals
and recover the data. Please note that the PNC based mechanism does not require the frames to reach the
receiver simultaneously since it can accurately locate the starting point of signal collisions [7].
We can use PNC to calculate the position of a wireless node. We use dMN to represent the distance
between two nodes M and N. We use T to represent a speciﬁc moment and t to represent a time duration. If
radio waves propagate at the speed s, the transmission delay between M and N will be dMN
s
. In our analysis,
we measure the diﬀerence between the arriving time of two sequences based on the starting point of signal
collisions. We can locate the symbol in the sequence from which the collision starts. Then we can translate
this information into a time diﬀerence based on the frequency of the radio signals.
432   Xiongwei Xie and Weichao Wang /  Procedia Computer Science  21 ( 2013 )  430 – 435 
Figure 1 illustrates an example of radio signals colliding at wireless receivers. We assume that four
nodes A, C, D, and E can receive the signals from each other. We also assume that nodes C, D, and E
know their positions. Node A wants to determine its position. Two anchor nodes C and D send out signal
sequences that will collide at both A and E. Without losing generality, we assume that C starts sending at
TC = 0 and D starts sending at TD ≥ 0.
Left: physical layer network coding. Middle: tdi f f A: diﬀerence b/w the arriving time of two sequences at node A.
Right: Node A is at the intersection of two hyperbolas.
Fig. 1. Node localization through physical layer network coding.
Node A will receive the sequence from C at dAC
s
, and the sequence from D at (TD + dADs ). The diﬀerence
between the arriving time is tdi f f A = (TD + dAD−dACs ). Similarly, we can calculate the diﬀerence between the
arriving time at node E as tdi f f E = (TD + dED−dECs ). The diﬀerence between tdi f f A and tdi f f E is:
tdi f f E − tdi f f A = (TD + dED − dEC
s
) − (TD + dAD − dAC
s
)
We simplify this equation and will get:
dAD − dAC = (dED − dEC) + s × (tdi f f A − tdi f f E) (1)
Since nodes C, D, and E know their positions, they can calculate dED − dEC . Using the values of tdi f f A and
tdi f f E , we can calculate dAD − dAC . Since nodes C and D know their positions, node A will reside on one
wing of the hyperbola that is jointly determined by the positions of C and D and the value of dAD − dAC . We
need more hyperbolas to determine the position of node A. We can choose other pairs of anchor nodes to
determine more hyperbolas. Node A will be positioned at the intersection point of these hyperbolas.
3. Detecting the PUE Attack
3.1. Overview of the Approach
In the remainder of the paper, we call the sender whose position we try to locate as the interested sender
(it could be the primary user or an emulator), and the sender of the interfered signals as the reference sender.
The PNC based localization technique provides a very promising approach to distinguish the real primary
user from an emulator: when an unknown signal is detected, a legitimate secondary user can intentionally
send out a sequence to interfere with the signal. Other secondary users can capture the interference results
and determine the hyperbolas. If the intersection point of the hyperbolas is at the known position of the
primary user, the secondary users will leave the channel. Otherwise, they will stay there.
The major challenge that we face is the safety of the approach. Since we cannot distinguish an attacker
from a legitimate secondary user, the attackers can participate in the localization procedure. They can send
out false information about their positions and interference results to mislead the calculation procedures.
Therefore, we must design mechanisms to defend against such attacks. In the following scenario, we assume
that trustworthy reference senders exist in the network. This scenario matches the application environments
of the IEEE 802.22 [8] and 802.16h [9] network standards. The trustworthy nodes can serve as the reference
senders during PUE detection. We assume that the signal from a trustworthy sender TR can be correctly
received by p legitimate secondary users {s1, s2, · · · , sp} and q attackers {m1,m2, · · · ,mq}. All these nodes
can correctly receive the signals from the real primary user P.
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When TR senses the communication channel and detects some signals that could have come from the
real primary user, it will initiate the PUE detection procedure. TR will choose a random number as the seed
for the PRBG to generate a random bit sequence and use the sequence to ﬁll a data packet. When it sends out
the packet, the radio waves from TR will interfere with the signals from the primary user (or an emulator).
Message authentication codes (MAC) will be attached to the packets to protect their integrity.
Using the mechanism in [7, 10], the wireless nodes can detect the signal collision and record the inter-
ference results. Using the MAC code from TR, they can verify the integrity of the packets. They will then
use the PRBG to regenerate the random sequence. Combining the interference results with the regenerated
sequence, the receivers can recover the packet from the interested sender. The receivers can then calculate
the tdi f f values based on the starting points of interference. Now every receiver (both legitimate secondary
users and attackers) will exchange its position, its tdi f f value, and the hash result of the recovered packet
with its neighbors. The broadcast packets will be protected by the MAC codes so that the receivers can
verify their contents. The secondary users can combine the tdi f f values with the node positions to determine
the position of the interested sender. Once the position is determined, secondary users can compare it with
the known position of the primary user to determine whether or not they are under a PUE attack.
3.2. Construct a Practical Approach
Who are the trustworthy senders: Several IEEE standards using the cognitive radio technique such
as 802.22 (CR for Wireless Regional Area Network) [8] and 802.16h (CR for WiMAX) [9] assume the
existence of base stations. Many of these base stations are deployed by the cellular phone/network service
providers. Therefore, these base stations can serve as the trustworthy senders. The standards such as 802.22
also require the base stations to have GPS devices and loosely synchronized clocks, which can be used for
PNC based localization [11] and hash chain based authentication [12], respectively.
Authentication of the Packets: We have assumed that the wireless nodes can attach a MAC code to the
packet to protect its authenticity and integrity. We propose to use the same method as in [3] to accomplish
the task. We assume that every node can generate a random number yi and use a secure hash function to
construct an l-entry one-way hash chain hash j(yi), (l ≥ j ≥ 0). If you have the knowledge of hash j1 (yi), it
will be very easy for you to authenticate hash j2 (yi) when we have l ≥ j1 ≥ j2 ≥ 0. However, the one-way
property will prevent an attacker from calculating an earlier entry in the hash chain.
3.3. Safety of the Approach
We assume that an emulator U tries to impersonate the real primary user P. During the PUE detection
procedure, for any legitimate secondary user si (i ∈ 1 · · · p), it will get the positions and the tdi f f values
from (p − 1) legitimate secondary users and q attackers. Since the received information is protected by
the MAC code of the senders, the attackers cannot impersonate other legitimate users. Using Equation
(1), si will alternatively combine its own information with information from the other p + q − 1 nodes
to determine p + q − 1 independent hyperbolas. Since the position information and tdi f f values from the
legitimate secondary users are true, the p− 1 independent hyperbolas that are determined based on si and sk
(k = 1 · · · p, k  i) will all pass through the position of node U.
To assist the emulator U to defeat the detection procedure, the attackers have to lie about their positions
and tdi f f values. Since information from the attackers contains their MAC code, the same attacker cannot
send diﬀerent position and tdi f f values to diﬀerent legitimate secondary users. Now we assume that the real
position and tdi f f value of the attacker mj are Posi(mj) and tdi f f (mj), respectively. mj will send out the false
information Posi(mj) and tdi f f (mj) to the legitimate secondary users. In the following description, we use
the overline bar (mj) to represent the values calculated based on the false information. For the legitimate
secondary user si, to allow the hyperbola determined by si and mj to pass through the position of the primary
user P, mj must make the false values satisfy:
dsiP − dmjP = (dsiTR − dmjTR) + s × (tdi f f (si) − tdi f f (mj)) (2)
To fool as many legitimate nodes as possible, the attacker needs to solve the following problem: given
the positions of the primary user P, the emulator U, and the legitimate nodes si (i = 1 · · · p), an attacker
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needs to calculate the fake information Posi(mj) and tdi f f (mj) so that all hyperbolas determined by mj and
si (i = 1 · · · p) will pass through P.
This problem is similar to the GPS spooﬁng attack in [13]. In their approach, the authors study the
relationship between the number of legitimate receivers to be fooled and possible positions of the satellite
impersonator. The results are shown in Table 1. In our approach, since emulator U is ﬁxed, the satellite
impersonator is replaced by the fake position information Posi(mj) of mj. For example, if we want to
mislead the localization results of four secondary users, mj must be positioned at one of the two points.
From Table 1, we ﬁnd that it is almost impossible to satisfy the requirements when there are more than three
legitimate secondary users in the neighborhood since all malicious nodes will be located at those two points.
Table 1. Relationship b/w number of victims and possible positions of the emulator
number of victims possible positions of the emulator
2 set of hyperboloids
3 set of intersections of two hyperboloids
4 set of two points
≥ 5 set of speciﬁc points
Based on the results in [13], we adopt the following scheme to determine the position of the interested
sender. We will choose a threshold value thresh. For a secondary user si, only when there are at least thresh
independent hyperbolas with si as one of the focal points passing through the same point, it will be used as
the position of the interested sender. If multiple positions satisfy this requirement, si will choose the position
with the largest number of hyperbolas as the interested sender.
4. Analysis and Simulation
4.1. Overhead of the Proposed Approach
Since the proposed approach incurs very little storage overhead at the secondary users, our analysis
will focus on the computation and communication overhead. The majority of the computation overhead is
caused by solving the hyperbolas to determine their intersections. Since a hyperbola can be treated as a
second-degree equation in the Cartesian coordinates, determining the intersections of two hyperbolas can
be viewed as a procedure to solve two second-degree equations. Several mechanisms to eﬃciently calculate
the intersections of hyperbolas have been proposed [14]. In [15] the authors propose a mechanism that uses
only simple add and shift operations in the computation.
The majority of the communication overhead comes from the exchange of the positions, tdi f f values,
hash results, and MAC codes. Every secondary user needs to send out its own information and receive
p + q − 1 copies from other nodes. We assume that the packets sent out by the secondary users contain l
bytes. Therefore, all users need to send out at most l× (p+q−1+1+1) = l× (p+q+1) bytes. If we assume
that l =128 Bytes, and p + q has the value of 10, in every round of PUE detection the secondary users need
to send out 1.4K Bytes altogether, which can be easily handled by modern wireless devices.
4.2. Simulation Results
We assess the detection accuracy of the proposed approach through simulation. We assume a network
area of 2000 × 2000m2. Both the legitimate secondary users and the attackers are randomly and uniformly
distributed in the network. The radio communication range is 250m. We assume that the trustworthy senders
are also randomly distributed in the network and every secondary user (both legitimate and malicious) is
covered by at least one sender. We study the impacts of the legitimate user and attacker densities, and the
selected threshold value on the detection accuracy. We focus on false negative alarms, in which an emulator
is incorrectly identiﬁed as the primary user.
Figure 2 illustrates the false alarm rates under diﬀerent node densities and threshold values. For each
curve, we have a constant number of legitimate users (good nodes) in the network and we introduce diﬀerent
numbers of attackers. From the simulation results, we can see that for diﬀerent node densities, their curves
will stay close to each other when the percentage of attackers is the same. This can be explained as follows.
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As the density of the attackers increases, they can cheat more legitimate secondary users under the same
threshold value. However, since the density of the legitimate users also increases, their ratio will stay the
same. We can also ﬁnd that when the threshold value increases, the false alarm rate starts to decrease since
more attackers are needed to cheat a single legitimate user.
From left to right: the selected threshold values are 4, 5, and 6, respectively. For each curve,
we have a constant number of legitimate users in the network and change the number of attackers.
Fig. 2. Detection accuracy under diﬀerent threshold values and node densities.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we propose a PUE detection mechanism for cognitive radio networks based on physical
layer network coding. The analysis shows that the diﬀerence between the starting points of interference at
two receivers is restricted by the positions of the senders. Using a trustworthy node as the reference sender,
we can determine multiple hyperbolas on which the interested sender resides. To turn this mechanism into
a practical approach, we study several problems in the network. We design the PUE detection mechanism
and study its overhead and the detection accuracy.
Immediate extensions to our approach consist of the following aspects. First, we will implement the
proposed approach in software deﬁned radio and test it in real network environments. Second, we will
extend our approach to the environments in which the reference senders could be malicious. Finally, we will
investigate using physical layer network coding to detect other attacks on wireless networks.
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